We consider secure two-party computation in a multiple-execution setting, where two parties wish to securely evaluate the same circuit multiple times. We design efficient garbled-circuitbased two-party protocols secure against malicious adversaries. Recent works by Lindell (Crypto 2013) and Huang-Katz-Evans (Crypto 2013) have obtained optimal complexity for cut-andchoose performed over garbled circuits in the single execution setting. We show that it is possible to obtain much lower amortized overhead for cut-and-choose in the multiple-execution setting.
Introduction
Two-party secure computation (2PC) is a rapidly developing area of cryptography. While the basic approach for semi-honest security, garbled circuits (GC) [Yao86] , is extensively studied and is largely settled, security against malicious players has seen recent significant improvements. The classical technique for lifting the GC approach to work in the malicious setting is cut-and-choose (C&C), formalized and proven secure by Lindell and Pinkas [LP07] . Until recently, this approach required significant overhead: to guarantee probability of cheating < 2 −s , approximately 3s garbled circuits needed to be generated and sent. However, in Crypto 2013 two works reduced the number of garbled circuits required in cut-and-choose to s + O(log s) [HKE13] and to s [Lin13] .
Our contribution. We further significantly reduce the replication factor for C&C-based protocols in the multiple execution setting, where the same function (possibly with different inputs) is evaluated multiple times either in parallel or sequentially. To achieve this, we combine in a novel way the "fast C&C" technique of Lindell [Lin13] with the "LEGO C&C" technique [FJN + 13, NO09].
phases. C outputs x to P 2 if φ is a valid proof of cheating; otherwise P 2 receives nothing. The efficiency improvement is due to the fact that cheating is punished if there is any inconsistency in outputs.
LEGO cut-and-choose [FJN + 13, NO09]. These works take a different approach by implementing a two-stage C&C at the gate level. The evaluation circuit is then constructed from the unopened garbled gates. In the first stage, P 1 sends multiple garbled gates and P 2 performs a standard C&C with replication factor ρ(s) = O(s/ log |C|). P 2 aborts if any opened gate is garbled incorrectly. In the next stage, P 2 partitions the ρ(s)|C| garbled gates into buckets such that each bucket contains O(ρ(s)) garbled gates. This two-stage C&C ensures that, except with probability 2 −s , each bucket contains a majority of correctly constructed garbled gates.
To connect gates with one another, Nielsen and Orlandi [NO09] use homomorphic Pedersen commitments. The resulting computational efficiency is relatively poor as they perform several expensive public-key operations per gate. This is addressed in the miniLEGO work [FJN + 13], where the authors (among other things) construct homomorphic commitments from oblivious transfer (OT), whose cost can be amortized by OT extension [IKNP03] . However, the overall efficiency of this construction is still lacking in concrete terms due to large constants inside the big-O notation. In particular, the communication efficiency is adversely affected by the use of asymptotically constantrate codes that are concretely inefficient.
Naïve Approaches to Combining Fast Cut-and-Choose with LEGO.
We now discuss two natural approaches for combining Lindell's fast C&C technique with LEGObased C&C to achieve protocols secure in the multiple execution setting, which yields baseline benchmarks.
The obvious and uninteresting approach is to simply run a maliciously-secure protocol multiple times. Note that to keep the total failure probability in t sequential executions at 2 −s , we need to increase the replication factor from s to s + log t. More interestingly, the following LEGO trick, implicit in the work of Nordholt et al. [NNOB12] , can help. Consider a circuit C which consists of t copies of the original circuit C. We perform gate-level LEGO C&C directly on C. 1 Doing this requires ρ = O(s/ log | C|) = O(s/(log |C| + log t)). However, while this is a good asymptotic improvement, the concrete efficiency of LEGO protocols is weak due to both heavy public-key machinery per gate [NO09] and expensive communication [FJN + 13]. Further, LEGO requires a majority of gates in each bucket to be good.
This leads to the second natural approach: use fast C&C in LEGO and require that as long as each bucket contains at least one (as opposed to a majority) correctly constructed garbled gate, the protocol succeeds. Unfortunately, the circuit C used in the corresponding cheating-punishment phase is no longer small. Indeed, C has to deliver P 1 's input x to P 2 if P 2 supplies a valid cheating proof φ. However, the number of possible proofs are now proportional to |C|, since such a proof could be generated from any of the |C| buckets. This implies that C is of size at least |C|. 2 Therefore, this approach cannot perform better than evaluating C from scratch using fast C&C.
Overview of Our Approach
Our main idea for the multiple execution setting is to run two-stage LEGO C&C at the circuit level, and then use fast C&C in the second stage (thereby requiring only a single correctly constructed circuit from each bucket). In particular, now the size of C used in each execution depends only on the input and output lengths of C, and is no longer proportional to |C|. In this section, we focus only on the cut-and-choose aspect of the protocol; namely, on preventing P 1 's cheating by submitting incorrect garbled circuits. More detailed protocol descriptions for both the parallel and sequential settings can be found in Section 2 and Section 3.
In the first-stage cut-and-choose, P 1 constructs and sends to P 2 a total of ρt GCs. Next, P 2 requests that P 1 open a random ρt/2-sized subset of the garbled circuits. If P 2 discovers that any opened garbled circuit is incorrectly constructed, it aborts. Otherwise, P 2 proceeds to the second stage cut-and-choose, where it randomly assigns unopened circuits to t buckets such that each bucket contains ρ/2 circuits. Now, as in the fast C&C protocol [Lin13] , each of the t evaluations are executed in two phases. In the first phase of the kth execution, party P 2 evaluates the ρ/2 evaluation circuits contained in the kth bucket. The circuits are designed such that if P 2 obtains different outputs from evaluating circuits in the kth bucket, then it obtains a proof of cheating φ k . Next, both parties continue to the cheating-punishment phase, where P 1 and P 2 securely evaluate a smaller circuit that outputs P 1 's input x k if P 2 provides a valid proof φ k .
Clearly, P 1 succeeds in cheating only if (1) it constructed m ≥ ρ/2 bad circuits, (2) none of these m bad circuits were caught in the first cut-and-choose stage (i.e., m ≤ ρt/2), and (3) in the second stage, there exists a bucket that contains all bad circuits. It is easy to see that the probability with which m bad circuits escape detection in the first stage cut-and-choose is ρt−m ρt/2 / ρt ρt/2 . Conditioned on this event happening, the probability that a particular bucket contains all bad circuits is m ρ/2 / ρt/2 ρ/2 . Applying the union bound, we conclude that the probability that P 1 succeeds in cheating is bounded by For any given t and s, the smallest ρ, hinging on the maximal probability of P 1 's successful attack, can be determined by enumerating over all possible values of m (i.e., {ρ/2, ρ/2 + 1, . . . , ρt/2}).
As an example, for t = 20 in a parallel execution setting with s = 40, using our protocol the circuit generator needs to construct 16 · t = 320 garbled circuits, whereas using a naïve application of Lindell's protocol [Lin13] requires 40 · t = 800 garbled circuits.
Parallel vs. sequential executions. As will be evident, it is important to distinguish between the settings where multiple evaluations are carried out in parallel (e.g., when all inputs are available at the start of the protocol) and where these evaluations are carried out sequentially (e.g., when not all inputs are available as they, for example, depend on the outputs of previous executions). Below, we provide an overview of the main challenges of each setting, and an outline of our solutions.
Parallel executions.
Under the DDH assumption, we apply our C&C technique in the parallel execution setting by modifying Lindell's protocol [Lin13] as follows. We construct a generalized cutand-choose oblivious transfer (C&C OT) functionality that supports multi-stage cut-and-choose. We call this functionality F mcot . Asymptotically, we can realize F mcot using general secure computation, since the circuit for F mcot depends only on the length of P 2 's input and is otherwise independent of the circuit. However, such a realization is extremely inefficient in practice (the size
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of the circuit for realizing F mcot needs to accept inputs of length at least nρt , where n is the computational security parameter and is the input length). Instead, we show an efficient realization that is only a factor ρt 2 /s less efficient (per execution) than the modified C&C OT realization of Lindell [Lin13] . We elaborate more on this, and other important details, in Section 2.
Sequential executions. To prevent a malicious evaluator from choosing its inputs based on the garbled circuit, GC-based 2PC protocols perform OT before the constructor sends its GCs to the evaluator (i.e., before the cut-and-choose phase). This forces the parties, and in particular the evaluator, to "commit" to their inputs before performing the cut-and-choose. This, however, does not work in the sequential setting, where the parties may not know all their inputs at the beginning of the protocol. Standard solutions used in previous works [AIKW13, GGP10, MR13] include assuming the garbled-circuit construction is adaptively secure or using adaptively-secure garbling [BHR12] explicitly, assuming the programmable random-oracle model. Another issue is that since now we perform OTs for each execution separately, we can no longer use C&C OT or its variants; instead we rely on the "XOR-tree" approach of Lindell and Pinkas [LP07] to avoid selective failure attacks. We elaborate more on this, and other details, in Section 3. Our solution for the sequential setting readily carries over to the parallel setting. In particular, adapting our protocol from the sequential to the parallel setting may address situations where the cost incurred by the use of F mcot outweighs the cost of using both the XOR-tree approach and adaptively secure garbled circuits.
Related Work
Lindell and Pinkas [LP07] gave the first 3 rigorous 2PC protocol based on cut-and-choose. For s = 40, their protocol required at least 17s = 680 garbled circuits. Subsequent work by the same authors [LP11] reduced the number of circuits to 128. This was later improved by shelat and Shen [sS11] to 125 using a more precise analysis of the C&C approach. In Crypto 2013, two works [HKE13, Lin13] proposed (among other things) dramatic improvements to the number of garbled circuits that need to be sent. In more detail, for achieving statistical security 2 −s , Huang et al.'s protocol [HKE13] requires 2s + O(log s) circuits, where each party generates half of them, and Lindell's protocol [Lin13] requires exactly s circuits.
While all of the above works perform cut-and-choose over circuits, applying cut-and-choose at the gate-level has also been considered [DO10, FJN + 13, NNOB12, NO09]. As discussed above, this approach naturally extends to the multiple execution setting, and furthermore is not inherently limited to considering settings where the same function is evaluated multiple times. Nielsen et al. [NNOB12] indeed show concrete efficiency improvements using gate-level cut-and-choose techniques. However, the number of rounds grows linearly with the depth of the evaluated circuit.
Finally, in independent and concurrent work, Lindell and Riva [LR14] also investigate the multiple execution setting, and obtain performance improvements similar to ours. An interesting difference between our works is that while we always let the evaluator pick half the circuits to check, they show that varying the number of check circuits can lead to an additional performance improvement.
Security Definition
We use the standard definition of security for two-party computation in the presence of malicious adversaries [Gol04, Chapter 7] . In this work, we consider the setting where a function is executed t times over different inputs, and explicitly describe the security definitions for such a setting in Appendix A.
The Parallel Execution Setting
Consider a setting where two parties wish to securely evaluate the same function multiple times in parallel (see Appendix A.1 for the formal security definition). Let f denote the function of interest, and let t denote the number of times the parties wish to evaluate f . Let P 1 's (resp., P 2 's) input in the kth execution be x k (resp., y k ), and let x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ). We define f (t) (x, y) = (f (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , f (x t , y t )).
We adapt Lindell's protocol [Lin13] to support our cut-and-choose technique in the parallel execution setting. The main difficulty is the design and construction of a generalization of cutand-choose oblivious transfer [LP11] which we use to avoid the "selective failure attack" where a malicious P 1 constructs invalid keys for P 2 's input wires to try and deduce P 2 's inputs based on if P 2 aborts execution or not. We discuss this more in Section 2.1. We note that the naïve idea of using the XOR-tree approach [LP07] in our setting does not appear to work without using adaptively secure garbled circuits. Specifically, it is no longer clear how P 1 , without any knowledge of which circuits will end up as evaluation circuits, can batch P 2 's input keys together in a way that lets P 2 learn different sets of input keys corresponding to different evaluation circuits and yet within each evaluation bucket guaranteeing that P 2 can learn only input keys corresponding to the same set of inputs.
We give details of our protocol construction for the parallel executions setting in Section 2.2.
Generalizing Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer
Cut-and-choose oblivious transfer (C&C OT) [LP11] is an extension of standard one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (OT). The sender inputs L pairs of strings, and the receiver inputs L selection bits to select one string out of each pair of sender strings. The receiver also inputs a set J of Inputs:
• P1 inputs vectors xi, each containing s pairs of values
In addition, P1 inputs s "check values" χ1, . . . , χs ∈ ({0, 1} n ) s .
• P2 inputs σ1, . . . , σ ∈ {0, 1} and a set of indices J ⊆ [s].
Outputs: P1 receives no output. P2 receives the following:
In other words, P2 receives {χj} j∈[s]\J and {{x i,j size L/2 that consists of indices where it wants both the sender's inputs to be revealed. Note that for indices not contained in J, only those sender inputs that correspond to the receiver's selection bits are revealed. In applications to secure computation, and in particular when transferring input keys corresponding to a particular input wire across all evaluation circuits, one needs single-choice cut-and-choose oblivious transfer, where the receiver is restricted to inputting the same selection bit in all the L/2 instances where it receives exactly one out of two sender strings. Furthermore, when transferring input keys for multiple input wires, it is crucial that the subset J input by the receiver is the same across each instance of single-choice C&C OT executed for all input wires. This variant, called batch single-choice C&C OT, can be realized from the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem [LP11] . Lindell [Lin13] presented a variant of batch single-choice C&C OT [LP11] in order to address settings where the check set J input by the receiver may be of arbitrary size. We denote this variant by F ccot ; see Figure 1 for the formal description. In this variant, in addition to obtaining one of the two sender inputs for pairs whose indices are not in J, the receiver also obtains a "check value" for each index not in J. These check values are used to confirm whether or not a circuit is an evaluation circuit.
For our purposes, we introduce a new variant of F ccot , which we call batch single-choice multistage C&C OT. We denote this primitive by F mcot and present its formal description in Figure 2 . At a high level, our variant differs from F ccot in that receiver P 2 can now input multiple sets J 1 , . . . , J t (where J is now implicitly defined as [ρt] \ ∪ k∈[t] J k ) and make independent selections for each of J 1 , . . . , J t . Unlike in Lindell's scheme [Lin13] , we only need to consider sets J 1 , . . . , J t whose sizes are pre-specified in order to provide the desired security guarantees. However, as in the F ccot functionality, F mcot (1) does not require sets J 1 , . . . , J t to be of a particular size, and (2) delivers "check values" for indices contained in each of J 1 , . . . , J t . These check values are used to confirm whether a circuit is an evaluation circuit in the kth bucket for some k ∈ [t].
Designing the F mcot functionality. As in F ccot , the sender P 1 inputs vectors x 1 , . . . , x each of length ρt, where each element in the vector is a pair of values (corresponding to the 0-key and the 1-key of a given garbled wire). In addition, P 1 inputs ρt 2 "check values". Receiver P 2 inputs t vectors σ 1 , . . . , σ t each of length and pairwise non-intersecting sets J 1 , . . . , J t . Upon receiving these inputs from P 1 and P 2 , the functionality computes J = [ρt] \ ∪ k∈[t] I k , and delivers, for each j ∈ J, the jth element (i.e., both values in the jth pair) in each of the vectors. Next, for every Inputs:
• P1 inputs vectors xi, each containing ρt 2 pairs x i,j 0 , x i,j 1 ∈ {0, 1} n . In addition, P1 inputs ρt 2 "check values" χ 1 1 , . . . , χ 1 ρt ; . . . ; χ t 1 , . . . , χ t ρt ∈ {0, 1} n . • P2 inputs σ1 = (σ1,1, . . . , σ 1, ), . . . , σt = (σt,1, . . . , σ t, ) ∈ {0, 1} and sets J1, . . . , Jt that are pairwise non-intersecting subsets of [ρt].
Outputs: Party P1 receives no output. Party P2 receives the following:
• For every k ∈ [t] and for every j ∈ J k , party P2 receives χ k j .
In other words, P2 receives sets k ∈ [t] and for each j ∈ J k , the functionality delivers to P 2 the σ k,i value in the jth pair of vector x i for every i ∈ [ ] along with the check value χ k j . Realizing F mcot in the F ccot -hybrid model. We now proceed to construct a protocol for F mcot . Our goal is to provide an information-theoretic reduction from F mcot to F ccot . We first consider a naïve approach which serves as a warm-up to our final construction and provides intuition behind our definition of F mcot .
The naïve approach. We propose the following natural approach to realizing F mcot from F ccot : P 1 first performs a t-out-of-t additive secret sharing of all input keys corresponding to P 2 's inputs. In addition, P 1 chooses ρt 2 check values. Next, P 1 and P 2 interact with the F ccot functionality t times in parallel. In the kth interaction, P 1 provides the kth additive share of its input plus ρt check values χ k 1 , . . . , χ k ρt (i.e., a check value for each circuit that could potentially be an evaluation circuit in the kth execution), while P 2 provides its inputs for the kth execution along with a set [ρt] \ J k , where J k indicates the indices of the evaluation circuits to be used in the kth execution.
At the end of the interaction, P 2 obtains (1) all t additive shares of input keys, and therefore all input keys, for circuits GC j with j ∈ J, and (2) all t additive shares of input keys that correspond to its actual input in the kth execution, and therefore its input keys, along with check values for circuits GC j with j ∈ J.
Note, in particular, that for the check circuits, P 2 does not obtain the check values, and for the evaluation circuits, P 2 does not obtain both input keys. Thus, the above protocol seems to successfully fulfill our requirements from the F mcot functionality. However, note that there is no mechanism in place to enforce that P 2 supplies non-intersecting sets J 1 , . . . , J k . In the following we show that this prevents the above protocol from realizing F mcot .
Suppose t = 2. A malicious P 2 may input overlapping sets J 1 , J 2 to F ccot . The consequence of this is that P 2 now possesses check values χ 1 j and χ 2 j for j ∈ J 1 ∩ J 2 . Clearly, the functionality F mcot does not allow this. On the other hand, recall that the input keys are all additively shared, and as a result P 2 does not possess input keys corresponding to its input in circuit GC j unless its input in both executions are identical. At the surface, there does not seem to be any attack due to this malicious strategy. Sure, P 2 can now equivocate on assigning GC j to either the first evaluation bucket or the second evaluation. However, as observed earlier, it either has no corresponding keys, or it is going to evaluate both circuits on the same input, say y (in which case it seems immaterial whether j is revealed as part of J 1 or J 2 ). Unfortunately, we show that the above strategy for malicious P 2 is not simulatable. In particular, at the end of the interaction with F ccot , the simulator successfully extracts P 2 's input in the first and second execution, but is now unable to decide on how to fake the garbled circuit GC j . On the one hand, if j ∈ J 1 , then the fake garbled circuit has to output z 1 = f (x 1 , y). On the other hand, if j ∈ J 2 , then the fake garbled circuit has to output z 2 = f (x 2 , y). Therefore, the simulator has to choose on how to fake GC j in the dark. Note that a simulation strategy for this specific case that decides to fake GC j to output z 1 with probability 1/2, and to output z 2 with probability 1/2, does indeed succeed with probability 1/2. However, this strategy does not extend well to the case when t is large.
The discussion above motivates our definition of F mcot ; in particular, it reinforces why F mcot must deliver at most one check value per circuit. In the following, we explain how to modify the naïve construction to enforce this.
Our approach. The high level idea behind our protocol is to let P 1 perform independent additive sharings of both the input values as well as the check values. Then P 1 and P 2 query the F ccot functionality t times to transfer the values as required by F mcot . We detail this below, explaining it in the context of our secure computation protocol.
Let (x i,j 0 , x i,j 1 ) be the input keys corresponding to P 2 's ith input wire in GC j . First, P 1 performs a t-out-of-t additive secret sharing of all input values corresponding to P 2 's inputs; i.e., for each
Then, instead of creating inputs to F ccot using x i,j,k c shares alone, P 1 instead creates a "share block"
That is, a share block X i,j,k c contains, in addition to a share of the input key, a share of all check values corresponding to circuit GC j .
Next, P 1 and P 2 run t instances of F ccot in parallel. In the kth interaction, in addition to the ρt check value shares χ k 1 , . . . , χ k ρt , P 1 provides its kth share block while P 2 provides its inputs for the kth execution along with a set [ρt] \ J k , where J k indicates the indices of the evaluation circuits to be used in the kth execution. Let J = [ρt] \ ∪ k∈[t] J k . At the end of the interaction, P 2 obtains (1) all t share blocks of input keys, and therefore all input keys, for circuits GC j with j ∈ J, and (2) all t share blocks of input keys that correspond to its actual input in the kth execution, and therefore its input keys, along with a check value χ k j for circuits GC j with j ∈ J k . Note, in particular, that for each check circuit GC j , P 2 does not obtain the check value χ k j for any k, because it always misses the check value share χ k j . For each evaluation circuit GC j with j ∈ J k , P 2 does not obtain both input keys, and more importantly can obtain at most one check value (which is χ k j ). This is because share blocks contain shares of input keys as well as shares of check values. For an evaluation circuit, party P 2 always misses a share block, and consequently shares of all values χ k j with k = k. Furthermore, if P 2 wants to ensure it receives χ k j , then it should never input J k such that k = k and yet j ∈ J k . This is because for j ∈ J k , P 2 is guaranteed to miss a share block that contains an additive share of χ k j . Note that the above observations suffice to deal with a malicious P 2 that inputs overlapping sets since in this case P 2 fails to obtain any check values corresponding to indices in the intersection.
The formal description of the protocol in the F ccot -hybrid model can be found in Figure 3 . We Inputs:
In addition, P1 inputs ρt 2 "check values" (χ 1 1 , . . . , χ 1 ρt ), . . . , (χ t 1 , . . . , χ t ρt ). All values are in {0, 1} n . • P2 inputs σ1 = (σ1,1, . . . , σ 1, ), . . . , σt = (σt,1, . . . , σ t, ) ∈ {0, 1} and sets J1, . . . , Jt.
Protocol:
• For all i ∈ [ ], P1 performs a t-out-of-t additive secret sharing of xi to obtain shares xi,1, . . . , xi,t. For
and P2 run t instances of Fccot in parallel as follows. In the kth instance:
, P2 does the following:
Figure 3:
Realizing F mcot in the F ccot -hybrid model. prove the following.
Theorem 1. There exists a protocol perfectly realizing F mcot in the F ccot -hybrid model.
Proof (Sketch). Consider the protocol described in Figure 3 . We prove that this protocol realizes F mcot in the F ccot -hybrid model. We split the analysis into two cases depending on whether P 1 or P 2 is corrupted.
P 1 is corrupted. The simulation is straightforward since P 1 does not receive any output. We describe it below.
• For each k ∈ [t], acting as F ccot simulator S obtains the following from P 1 : (1) vectors of pairs
• S sends vectors of pairs x i of length ρt, for i ∈ [ ], and ρt 2 "check values" (χ 1 1 , . . . , χ 1 ρt ), . . ., (χ t 1 , . . . , χ t ρt ) to F mcot and terminates outputting whatever P 1 outputs.
P 2 is corrupted. The simulation is slightly tricky since a malicious P 2 may input sets J 1 , . . . , J t that are intersecting to F ccot . For clarity, we denote the (effective) sets input by P 2 as I 1 , . . . , I t . The key observation is that none of the input values or check values are determined until P 2 completes its final query to F ccot . Due to symmetry and hence without loss of generality, in the following, we assume P 2 last query to F ccot is its tth query. We describe the simulation below.
• For each 1 ≤ k < t acting as F ccot simulator S interacts with P 2 for the kth query in the following way:
-S obtains the following from P 2 : (1) σ k,1 , . . . , σ k, and (2) the set [ρt] \ I k . Let σ k = (σ k,1 , . . . , σ k, ).
-S chooses uniformly random and independent values X i,j,k
In addition, S chooses uniformly random and independent valuesχ k
• Acting as F ccot simulator S first obtains the tth query from P 2 as (1) σ t,1 , . . . , σ t, , and (2) the set [ρt] \ I t .
• S chooses values {χ t j } j∈ [ρt] as follows:
as follows:
to P 2 , and terminates outputting whatever malicious P 2 outputs.
First we show that if malicious P 2 inputs I 1 , . . . , I t such that these sets are pairwise non-intersecting, then its view in the above simulation is identically distributed to its view in the real execution. In this case, it is easy to see that for all k ∈ [t] the extracted sets J k in the simulation are identical to I k input by P 2 . Further, J = [ρt] \ ∪ k∈[t] I k also holds. Observe that for j = j the randomness used by honest P 1 in the real execution to create values
Clearly, this is also the case in the simulated execution. This allows us to split the analysis depending on the value of j.
are identically distributed in both executions (i.e., uniformly random and independent subject to
). Furthermore, the view of P 2 is independent of the values x i,j 1−σ k,i since these are information-theoretically hidden from the real execution (as is the case in the ideal execution). This is because in the kth query to F ccot party P 2 did not receive one of the additive shares of
Next, it is easy to verify that the check values χ k j and its additive sharesχ k
i∈[ ] are also identically distributed in both executions. Also, we claim that the view of P 2 in the real execution is independent of the values {χ k j } k =k . This is because in the kth query to F ccot party P 2 did not receive, for every k = k, at least one of the additive shares of χ k j , e.g.,
uniformly random and independent subject to
. Furthermore, we claim that the view of P 2 in the real execution is independent of the values {χ k j } k∈ [t] . This is because in the kth query to F ccot party P 2 did not receive, for every k ∈ [t], exactly one of the additive shares of χ k j , i.e.,χ k j .
Given the above, it follows that the view of malicious P 2 in the simulated execution is identically distributed to its view in the real execution. Now we need to consider the case when malicious P 2 inputs sets I 1 , . . . , I t but these are no longer pairwise non-intersecting. We define sets
As in the case when I 1 , . . . , I k were pairwise non-intersecting, we will split the analysis depending on the value of j. It is easy to verify that the analysis in the cases when j ∈ J k is identical to its counterpart in the case when I 1 , . . . , I k were pairwise nonintersecting. Likewise the analysis in the cases when j ∈ J 0 is identical to the analysis in j ∈ J cases when I 1 , . . . , I k were pairwise non-intersecting. We only need to analyse the case when j ∈ J 0 \ J. Such a j would exist only when there exists distinct k, k ∈ [t] such that j ∈ I k and j ∈ I k . In this case, note that by construction, the simulated values for
and thus the shares obtained by P 2 corresponding to the x i,j 0 , x i,j 1 values are identically distributed. It remains to show that as in the simulated execution, the view of P 2 in the real execution is independent of the values {χ k j } k ∈[t] . Indeed, we claim that when j ∈ I k the value χ k j is independent of its view if there exists k = k such that j ∈ I k . This is because for j ∈ I k , the value χ k j can be reconstructed only if all its additive sharesχ k j ,
obtained. However, if j ∈ I k , then in the k th query to F ccot party P 2 loses its chance to receive at least one of the additive shares of χ k j , e.g., χ 1,j,k 0,k . Thus, we conclude that the claim holds. This completes the proof that the view of malicious P 2 in the simulated execution is identically distributed as in the real execution.
Cost of Realizing F mcot from DDH
As described, the cost of realizing F mcot is t times the cost of realizing F ccot for vectors of pairs of length ρt with each element of size (t + 1)n. Thus if we use Lindell's existing F ccot construction [Lin13] in order to implement F mcot from DDH, then for each of the t executions we need to use 9ρ t fixed-base exponentiations and 1.5ρ t regular exponentiations, and need to send a total of 5ρ t group elements. However, note we need to use a group of much larger size (in order to support elements of size (t + 1)n). This has the adverse effect of drastically reducing the computational efficiency as now we need to perform modular exponentiations over much larger groups.
Fortunately, the situation can be remedied using "length extension" techniques for F ccot . Specifically, first we realize the protocol for F ccot as above except we replace each actual element, say X i,j,k 0 , that needs to be transferred by a single group element, say K i,j,k 0 , that will be interpreted as a "key". Then, once the protocol for F ccot is executed, the sender now sends encryptions of the each actual element under the corresponding key (e.g.,
where G is a PRG). As is the case with 1-out-of-2 OT length extension, this length extension transformation for F ccot is also UC-secure. The proof is also identical to the case for 1-out-of-2 OT length extension and is omitted. In summary, by tolerating an additional cost of sending 2ρ t 2 symmetric elements (for each of the t executions), we can work over standard DDH groups as in Lindell's protocol [Lin13] .
Alternative Approaches
As discussed before, F mcot can be realized using general secure computation, but this results in extremely poor efficiency. In particular, the circuit computing F mcot is of size at least nρ t, and realization by state-of-the-art secure protocols would further include a multiplicative ns overhead. We leave a more efficient realization of F mcot from either F ccot or directly from DDH as an open question.
In settings where the ρt 2 /s multiplicative overhead of realizing F mcot through our protocol is expensive relative to the size of the circuit, one may wonder whether it is possible to use XOR-tree approaches to obtain better efficiency. Unfortunately, we do not know if this approach can be made to work with standard Yao garbled circuits [LP07] . Specifically, it is no longer clear how P 1 , without any knowledge of the evaluation sets, can batch P 2 's input keys together in a way that lets P 2 learn different sets of input keys corresponding to different evaluation circuits and yet within each evaluation bucket guaranteeing that P 2 can learn only input keys corresponding to the same set of inputs. However, if we assume that the garbling scheme is adaptively secure, then this lets us perform the oblivious transfer step after P 1 commits to its garbled circuits. Now P 2 can reveal its evaluation buckets one-by-one thereby letting P 1 to successfully batch P 2 's input keys in the right manner. (See our protocol for sequential executions in Section 3 for a full description on how to do this.)
Finally, we note that the overhead of implementing the XOR-tree along with the necessary commitments can be quite prohibitive for certain choices of parameters [LP11, LPS08] , and a careful comparison with our F mcot realization is advised before using XOR-tree type constructions.
Using F mcot in the Parallel Execution Setting
The input vectors x i , for i ∈ [ ], contain the key pairs associated with the ith input wire for P 2 in each of the ρt circuits. The vector σ k corresponds to the inputs used by P 2 in the kth execution. An honest P 2 chooses sets J 1 , . . . , J t such that they are pairwise non-intersecting and each set is of size exactly ρ/2. The main observation is that, for a given execution k ∈ [t], P 2 obtains check values χ k j from F mcot only for j ∈ J k . Therefore, once the parties complete the interaction with F mcot and P 1 sends all the garbled circuits, we let P 1 determine the evaluation circuits in each bucket based on whether P 2 sends the corresponding check values. At this point, P 1 checks that each bucket of evaluation circuits is well-defined and that these buckets are of equal size, i.e., ρ/2. If not, P 1 aborts. To overcome technical difficulties, we also require P 2 to provide "check values" for the check circuits as well. A check value for check circuit GC j , denoted χ j , may simply be the set of all input keys (i.e., both the 0-key and the 1-key) on all wires in circuit GC j .
Applying the cheating-punishment technique. Inspired by Lindell's protocol [Lin13] , we use the knowledge of two different garbled values for a single output wire as a "proof" that P 2 received inconsistent outputs in a given execution. P 2 can use this proof to obtain P 1 's input in a cheatingpunishment phase. This cheating-punishment phase is implemented via a secure computation protocol, and thus it is important that the second phase functionality has a small circuit. We employ several optimizations proposed by Lindell [Lin13] to keep the size of this circuit small. One important difference in our setting is that, unlike in Lindell's protocol [Lin13] , we cannot have, for a given output wire w, the same output keys b 0 w , b 1 w across all garbled circuits. This is because in our setting garbled circuits are assigned to different evaluation buckets, and the circuits in each bucket can be evaluated with different input values, and thus can produce different outputs. Thus (even an honest) P 2 could potentially learn, say, output key b 0 w in one execution and output key b 1 w in another. We address this by simply removing the requirement that the set of output keys across different garbled circuits are the same. Thus, the circuit for the cheating-punishment phase for the kth execution must now take as input from P 1 all of the output keys in all of the evaluation circuits in the kth bucket, and from P 2 a pair of output keys that serve as proof of cheating. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that the size of the circuit (measured as the number of non-XOR gates) for the cheating-punishment phase is essentially the same as the circuit in Lindell's protocol [Lin13] . 4 Another detail we wish to point out is that in our protocol we need to run separate cheatingpunishment phases for each execution. This is a restriction imposed by the way in which P 1 proves consistency of its inputs [Lin13, LP11] . However, we can run all of the t cheating-punishment phases in parallel. For this reason we use the universally composable variant of Lindell and Pinkas's protocol [LP11] (which is essentially obtained by replacing oblivious transfers and zero-knowledge subprotocols with their universally composable variants) to implement each cheating-punishment phase.
Other details. We now describe other important details of our protocol.
• Input consistency across multiple executions. It is important to guarantee that P 1 provides consistent inputs across all circuits in the kth execution. Fortunately, existing mechanisms [Lin13, LP11] for ensuring input consistency in the single execution setting can be readily extended to the multiple execution setting as well.
• Encoded translation tables for garbled circuits. As in Lindell's protocol [Lin13] , we modify the output translation tables used in the garbled circuits. Specifically, for keys k 0 i , k 1 i on output wire i, we create an encoded output table [h(k 0 i ), h(k 1 i )], where h is some one-way function. We require that the output keys (or more precisely, the output of h applied to the output keys) corresponding to 0 and 1 are distinct. This encoding gives us the following two properties:
(1) P 2 after evaluating a garbled circuit can use the encoded translation tables to determine whether the output is 0 or 1, and (2) the encoded translation table does not reveal the other output key (since this is equivalent to inverting the one-way function) to P 2 .
• Optimizing the cheating-punishment circuit. We can apply similar techniques as shown by Lindell [Lin13] to optimize the size of the cheating-punishment circuit to contain only non-XOR gates. See Section 2.2.1.
Formal description. We proceed to the formal description of our protocol.
Inputs: P 1 has input x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ), where x k ∈ {0, 1} , and P 2 has input y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ), where y k ∈ {0, 1} .
Auxiliary Inputs:
A statistical security parameter s, a computational security parameter n, the description of a circuit C where C(x, y) = f (x, y), the number of evaluations t of the function f , and (G, q, g) where G is a cyclic group with generator g and prime order q, where q is of length n. Let Ext : G → {0, 1} n be a function mapping group elements to bitstrings. In the following, ρ = ρ(s, t) is the replication factor defined as being the smallest u ∈ N such that for all m ∈ {u/2, . . . , ut/2} it holds that t · ut−m ut/2 m u/2 / ut ut/2 ut/2 u/2 ≤ 2 −s . If no such u exists or if ρ ≥ s, then parties abort this protocol, and instead run the fast C&C protocol [Lin13] for the function f (t) .
Outputs: P 2 receives f (t) (x, y) and P 1 receives no output. Let denote the length of the output of f (x, y).
Protocol:
Input key choice and circuit preparation:
• P 1 chooses random values a 0 1 , a 1 1 , . . . , a 0 , a 1 ∈ R Z q , r 1 , . . . , r ρt ∈ R Z q and (b 0
n such that for every c 1 , c 2 ∈ {0, 1}, j 1 , j 2 ∈ [ρt], i 1 , i 2 ∈ [ ] it holds that b c1 j1,i1 = b c2 j2,i2 iff i 1 = i 2 and j 1 = j 2 and c 1 = c 2 .
• Let w 1 , . . . , w denote the input wires corresponding to P 1 's input, let w i,j denote the ith input wire in the jth garbled circuit, and let k b i,j denote the key associated with bit b on wire w i,j . P 1 sets k b i,j as follows:
• Let w 1 , . . . , w denote the output wires. The keys for wire w i in the jth garbled circuit are set to b 0 j,i and b 1 j,i . • P 1 constructs ρt independent garblings, GC 1 , . . . , GC ρt , of circuit C, using random keys except for wires w 1 , . . . , w and w 1 , . . . , w m , where the keys are set as above.
2. Oblivious transfers: P 1 and P 2 run F mcot as follows:
• For i ∈ [ ], let z i denote a vector containing the ρt pairs of keys associated with P 2 's ith input bit in all the garbled circuits. P 1 inputs z 1 , . . . , z , as well as random values χ 1 1 , . . . , χ 1 ρt ; . . . ; χ t 1 , . . . , χ t ρt . • P 2 inputs random sets J 1 , . . . , J t which are pairwise non-intersecting subsets of [ρt] such that for all k ∈ [t] it holds that |J k | = ρ/2. Let J = [ρt] \ ∪ k∈[t] J k . P 2 also inputs bits (σ 1,1 , . . . , σ 1, ) , . . . , (σ t,1 , . . . , σ t, ) ∈ {0, 1} , where σ k,i = y k,i for every i ∈ [ ] and k ∈ [t].
• For j ∈ J, P 2 receives both input keys associated with its input wires in garbled circuit GC j , and for each k ∈ [t] and j ∈ J k , P 2 receives the keys associated with its input y k on its input wires in garbled circuit GC j . Also, for every k ∈ [t] and j ∈ J k , P 2 receives χ k j . 3. Send circuits and commitments: P 1 sends P 2 the garbled circuits GC 1 , . . . , GC ρt , the "seed" for the randomness extractor Ext, the following commitment to the garbled values associated with P 1 's input wires:
and the encoded output translation tables:
If h(b 0 j,i ) = h(b 1 j,i ) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ , 1 ≤ j ≤ ρt, then P 2 aborts. 4. Send cut-and-choose challenge: P 2 sends P 1 the sets J, J 1 , . . . , J t along with values {χ 1 j } j∈J1 , . . . , {χ t j } j∈Jt , and all the keys associated with its input wires in all circuits GC j for j ∈ J. If the values received by P 1 are (1) incorrect, or (2) the sets J 1 , . . . , J t are not pairwise non-intersecting, or (3) the input keys associated with P 2 's input wires in circuits GC j are revealed incorrectly, or (4) there exists some k ∈ [t] such that |J k | = ρ/2, then it outputs ⊥ and aborts. Circuits GC j for j ∈ J are called check circuits and circuits GC j for j ∈ J k are called evaluation circuits in the kth bucket.
Send garbled input values in the evaluation circuits:
For each k ∈ [t]: P 1 sends the input keys associated with input x k for the evaluation circuits in the kth bucket: For each j ∈ J k and every wire i ∈ [ ], P 1 sends the value k i,j = g a x k,i i ·rj and P 2 sets k i,j = Ext(k i,j ).
Circuit evaluation:
For each k ∈ [t], P 2 does the following:
• For each j ∈ J k and every wire i ∈ [ ], P 2 computes b j,i by evaluating GC j . If P 2 receives exactly one valid output value per output wire, then let z k denote this output. In this case, it chooses random values b k 0 , b k 1 ∈ R {0, 1} n . If P 2 receives two valid outputs on any output wire then it sets b k 0 = b j1,i and b k 1 = b j2,i , where j 1 , j 2 ∈ J k denote the conflicting circuit indices. If P 2 receives no valid output values on any output wire, then P 2 aborts. 7. Run secure computation to detect cheating: For each k ∈ [t], P 1 and P 2 do the following in parallel: P 1 defines a circuit with the values {b 0 j,1 , b 1 j,1 , . . . , b 0 j, , b 1 j, } j∈J k hardcoded. The circuit computes the following function:
• P 1 inputs x k ∈ {0, 1} and has no output.
• P 2 inputs a pair of values b k 0 , b k 1 . • If there exists values i ∈ [ ] and j 1 , j 2 ∈ J k such that b k 0 = b 0 j1,i and b k 1 = b 1 j2,i , then P 2 's output is x k ; otherwise it receives no output. P 1 and P 2 run the UC-secure protocol of Lindell and Pinkas [LP11] on this circuit (except for the proof of P 1 's input values), as follows:
• P 1 inputs x k ; P 2 inputs b k 0 and b k 1 as computed in Step 6. • The garbled circuits constructed by P 1 use the same a 0 i , a 1 i values as were chosen in Step 1, and the parties use 3(s + log t) copies of the circuit for the cut-and-choose.
If this computation results in an abort, then both parties halt.
Check circuits for computing f (t) (x, y):
• For j ∈ J, P 1 sends r j to P 2 , and P 2 checks that these values are consistent with the pairs {(j, g rj )} j∈J received in Step 3. If not, P 2 aborts.
• For every j ∈ J, P 2 uses the g a 0 i , g a 1 i values received in Step 3 and the r j values received above to compute the keys for P 1 's input wires as k 0 i,j = Ext(g a 0 i ·rj ), k 1 i,j = Ext(g a 1 i ·rj ). In addition, P 2 uses the keys obtained from F mcot in Step 2 for its own input wires. P 2 verifies that GC j is a correct garbling of C. If there exists a circuit for which this does not hold, then P 2 aborts.
Verify consistency of P 1 's input: For each k ∈ [t]: Let J k be the set of check circuits used in the 2PC computation in
Step 7 for the kth bucket, let r j,k be the value used in that computation, and letk i,j be the analogous value of k i,j in Step 5 received by P 2 in the computation in Step 7.
For each k ∈ [t], P 1 and P 2 do the following in parallel:
• For every input wire i ∈ [ ], P 1 proves a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge that there exist some σ k,i ∈ {0, 1} such that for every j ∈ J k and every j ∈Ĵ k , it holds that
If any of the t proofs fail, then P 2 aborts.
Output evaluation:
• If P 2 received no inconsistent outputs in Step 6, then it uses the encoded translation tables to decode the outputs it received, and sets z k to that value. If P 2 received inconsistent output, then let x k be the output that P 2 received from the circuit in Step 7. Let z k = f (x k , y k ) be the output in this case. P 2 outputs z = (z 1 , . . . , z t ) and terminates.
We prove the following theorem in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Let s (resp., n) be the statistical (resp., computational) security parameter. If the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in (G, g, q) , h is a one-way function, and the underlying circuit garbling procedure is secure, then for all t = poly(n), the protocol described above securely computes f (t) in the presence of a malicious adversary with error at most 2 −s + µ(n) for some negligible function µ(·).
Optimizing the Circuit in Step 7
We use an optimization inspired by Lindell [Lin13] to construct an alternate circuit that minimizes the number of non-XOR gates. Specifically, Lindell [Lin13] shows how to efficiently construct a garbled circuit that checks if a given n-bit string is contained in a set S of size m. The garbled circuit has the property that it only requires (where equals the length of each party's input) non-XOR gates, and thus can be essentially computed for free using, e.g., the free-XOR technique [KS08] . This optimization relies on the fact that to take an n-wise AND of two n-bit strings, it suffices to encrypt the output 1-key with the 1-keys on the input wires. Therefore, to compare two n bit strings, we first XOR the two strings bit-by-bit, take the NOT of these bits, and finally output the n-wise AND of the resulting bits using the trick described above. Next, to check that a n-bit string equals any of the m strings in S, we need to evaluate the m-wise OR of each of these comparisons. Instead of using m − 1 OR gates, we can set the 1-key on all of the output wires from the n-wise ANDs above to be the 1-key on the output wire of the OR. Since the XOR and NOT gates can be evaluated for free [KS08] , it follows that the above circuit can essentially be securely evaluated for free. 5 We now adapt these optimizations to our setting, while still minimizing the number of non-XOR gates. For string b and set S, we use the notation b ? ∈ S to denote a boolean expression that evaluates to 1 iff b ∈ S. In our protocol we require a circuit that takes, in addition to an -bit string u (representing P 1 's actual input), a pair of n-bit strings, say b 0 , b 1 , and two sets S 0 , S 1 of n-bit strings, each set of size m = ρ /2, and outputs u iff ((b 0
∈ S 0 )) = 1, i.e., an additional cost of 3 non-XOR gates. Alternatively, we may instead evaluate the expression
(Note that a cheating P 2 can guess a value in S only with negligible probability.) This has the additional advantage of reducing P 2 's input length from 2n to n (and the resulting gains from performing a lesser number of cut-and-choose oblivious transfers). In summary, it is possible to design the circuit in Step 7 using exactly non-XOR gates (i.e., AND gates to select the length-P 1 input depending on whether the relevant conditions are satisfied). It follows from the protocol description that the total number of garbled gates sent in Step 7 is 3 (s + log t) in each of the t executions.
The Sequential Execution Setting
We now consider the setting where the parties securely evaluate the same function f multiple times sequentially (see Appendix A.2 for the formal security definition). Let t denote the number of times the parties wish to evaluate f . Let P 1 's (resp., P 2 's) input in the kth execution be denoted by x k (resp., y k ). Let f [t] denote the reactive functionality that computes f a total of t times sequentially.
The main difference between this setting and the parallel setting discussed in Section 2 is that in the sequential setting the parties may not know their inputs to all executions at the start of the protocol. In particular, inputs may depend on outputs from previous executions. Thus, the parallel execution protocol does not immediately carry over to the sequential setting. To see why, observe for instance that F mcot requires P 2 to submit all of its inputs at once 6 . This is not possible since in the sequential setting we cannot assume that P 2 has all its inputs at the beginning of the protocol. Instead, we take a different route; namely, we use the "XOR-tree" approach [LP07, Woo07] to protect against the so-called "selective failure attack" [KS06, MF06, sS11] . (In the parallel execution setting, this attack was implicitly avoided due to the use of F mcot .) In this approach, the circuit C to be evaluated is first modified into an equivalent circuit C XT (to include an "XORtree" for P 2 's inputs). Then, P 1 sends commitments to input keys corresponding to P 2 's input wires in C XT . The corresponding decommitments are revealed to P 2 via a standard one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. In order to prevent P 2 from using different inputs across evaluation circuits within the same bucket, P 1 batches together the decommitments corresponding to a particular input wire across all evaluation circuits in a given bucket. Note that herein lies an opportunity for a malicious P 1 to force P 2 to abort the protocol depending on its input. (This can be done for instance by sending incorrect decommitments for say only the 0-key on a particular wire.) However, the modified circuit C XT is such that the success of any such selective OT attack is statistically independent of P 2 's actual input value. Therefore, if an honest P 2 receives an invalid decommitment and is unable to decrypt the evaluation circuit, then it simply aborts knowing that its privacy is not compromised. Finally, we note that since we use one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (as opposed to F mcot ), we can leverage oblivious transfer extension techniques [IKNP03, IPS08, NNOB12] to obtain better efficiency.
We stress that the oblivious transfer step happens after P 1 sends all the GCs to P 2 . This is because P 2 's inputs to all t executions are not available at the beginning of the protocol. Further, P 2 's inputs may depend on previous outputs, which can be obtained only by decrypting evaluation circuits, i.e., after the evaluation bucket for the current execution is fully determined. Note that our cut-and-choose technique guarantees that there is at least one good evaluation circuit in every bucket under the assumption that P 1 has already committed to all its (good and bad) garbled circuits before the check sets and the evaluation sets are determined. Unfortunately, the above ordering of the oblivious transfer step and the garbled circuit sending step now allows a malicious P 2 to choose its input as a function of the garbled circuits it receives. To counter this, we need to use adaptively secure garbling schemes [BHR12] instead of standard garbled circuits; adaptively secure garbling schemes can be constructed efficiently in the programmable random oracle model [BHR12] . Note that we do not need the use of adaptively secure garbling schemes for implementing the cheating-punishment phase. Indeed, all the inputs for that subprotocol are known before the phase begins, and therefore, the oblivious transfer step can be carried out before P 1 sends its garbled circuits for that phase.
Formal description. We now proceed to the formal description of the protocol.
Auxiliary Input: A statistical security parameter s, a computational security parameter n, the description of a circuit C where C(x, y) = f (x, y), the number of evaluations t of the function f , and (G, q, g) where G is a cyclic group with generator g and prime order q, where q is of length n. Let Ext : G → {0, 1} n be a randomness extractor known to both parties. In the following, ρ is the replication factor implicitly defined by parameters t and s as being the smallest u ∈ N such that for all m ∈ {u/2, . . . , ut/2} it holds that t · ut−m ut/2 m u/2 ut ut/2 ut/2 u/2 ≤ 2 −s . If no such u exists or if ρ ≥ s + log t, then the parties abort this protocol and instead run the protocol of Lindell [Lin13] for function f a total of t times sequentially. Additional Notation: Let , denote the length of each input and the final output f (x, y), respectively, and let C XT denote the circuit C enhanced with the XOR-tree.
Offline Phase:
Input key choice and circuit preparation:
P1 chooses random values a 0 1 , a 1 1 , . . . , a 0 , a 1 , r1, . . . , rρt ∈R Zq and (b 0 1,1 , b 1 1,1 , . . . , b 0 1, , b 1 1, ), . . . ,
and j1 = j2 and c1 = c2. Let w1, . . . , w be the input wires corresponding to P1's input in C XT , let wi,j denote the ith input wire in the jth garbled circuit, and let k b i,j denote the key associated with bit b on wire wi,j. P1 sets k b i,j as follows: k 0 i,j = Ext(g a 0 i ·r j ) and k 1 i,j = Ext(g a 1 i ·r j ). Let w1, . . . , w XT be the input wires corresponding to P2's input in C XT , and denote by wi,j the instance of wire wi in the jth garbled circuit, and k b i,j the key associated with bit b on wire wi,j. Then, P1 picks the keys for P2's input wires uniformly at random, and computes (standard) commitments e 0 i,j = com( k 0 i,j ) and e 1 i,j = com( k 1 i,j ). Let d 0 i,j and d 1 i,j denote the corresponding decommitments. Let w 1 , . . . , w denote the output wires in C XT . The keys for wire w i in the jth garbled circuit are set as b 0 j,i , b 1 j,i . P1 constructs ρt independent adaptively secure garblings of circuit C XT , denoted GC1, . . . , GCρt, using random keys except for wires w1 , . . . , w and w 1 , . . . , w m , where the keys are as above.
2. Send circuits and commitments: P1 sends P2 the garbled circuits, the "seed" for the randomness extractor Ext, the commitments to the garbled values associated with P1's input wires:
, the encoded output translation tables: [ρt] , and the commitments to the garbled values associated with P2's input wires: 
Correctness of check circuits:
For every j ∈ J, P2 uses the g a 0 i , g a 1 i values received in Step 3 and the rj values received in Step 4 to compute the values k 0 i,j = Ext(g a 0 i ·r j ), k 1 i,j = Ext(g a 1 i ·r j ) associated with P1's input. Given all the garbled values for all input wires in GCj, i.e., {k 0
, party P2 decrypts the circuit and verifies that it is a garbling of C XT , using the encoded translation tables for the output values. If there exists a circuit for which this does not hold, then P2 aborts.
On-line Phase:
For each 1 ≤ k ≤ t execute the following sequentially:
1. Receive inputs: P1 and P2 obtain inputs x k and y k , respectively. Using additional randomness, P2 transforms its input y k for circuit C into an equivalent input y k for circuit C XT .
2. Second-stage cut-and-choose challenge: P2 picks J k ⊆ [ρt] \ J of size ρ/2 such that J1, . . . , J k are pairwise non-intersecting. P2 sends J k to P1, who aborts the protocol if |J k | = ρ/2 or J k intersects with a previously sent subset. We call J k the kth evaluation bucket.
If there exists j ∈ J k and i ∈ [ XT ] such that d y k,i i,j is not a valid decommitment to e y k,i i,j , then P2 aborts and outputs ⊥. Else, P2 computes the keys { k y k,i i,j } i∈[ XT ],j∈J k corresponding to the decommitments it received. Let ki,j = k y k,i i,j 4. P1 sends its garbled input values in the evaluation circuits: P1 sends the input keys associated with input x k for the evaluation circuits in the kth bucket: For each j ∈ J k and every wire i ∈ [ ], P1 sends the value k i,j = g a x k,i i ·r j and P2 sets ki,j = Ext(k i,j ).
5.
Circuit evaluation: P2 uses the keys {ki,j} i∈[ ] associated with P1's input and the keys { ki,j} i∈[ XT ] associated with its own input to evaluate the circuits GCj for j ∈ J k as follows:
For every wire i ∈ [ ], P2 computes b j,i by evaluating GCj. If P2 receives exactly one valid output value per output wire, then let z k denote this output. In this case, it chooses b k 0 , b k 1 ∈R {0, 1} n . If P2 receives two valid outputs on any output wire, then it sets b k 0 = b j 1 ,i and b k 1 = b j 2 ,i , where j1, j2 ∈ J k are the conflicting circuit indices and i ∈ [ ] is the conflicting wire. If P2 receives no valid output values on any output wire, then P2 aborts.
6. Run secure computation to detect cheating: P1 defines a circuit C as follows:
The circuits has the values {b 0
P1 and P2 run the protocol of [LP11] (except for the proof of P1's input values) on C as follows:
Step 5. The garbled circuits constructed by P1 use the same a 0 i , a 1 i values as were chosen in Step 1, and the parties use 3(s + log t) copies of the garbled circuit for the cut-and-choose.
If this computation results in an abort, then both parties halt at this point. 7. Verify consistency of P1's input: Let J k be the set of check circuits in the 2PC computation in
Step 6, and likewise, let r j,k be the value used in that computation as the equivalent of the rj values in
Step 1 of the offline-phase. Let ki,j be the analogous value of k i,j in Step 4 received by P2 in the 2PC computation in Step 6. P1 and P2 do the following in parallel: For every input wire i ∈ [ ], P1 proves a zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge that there exists some σ k,i ∈ {0, 1} such that for every j ∈ J k and every j ∈ J k , it holds that k i,j = g a σ k,i i ·r j andki,j = g a σ k,i i ·r j ,k . If any of the proofs fail, then P2 aborts.
Output evaluation:
If P2 received no inconsistent outputs in Step 6, then it uses the encoded translation tables to decode the outputs it received, and sets z k to that value. If P2 did receive inconsistent output, then let x k be the output that P2 received from the 2PC computation in Step 7; P2 sets z k = f (x k , y k ). Finally, P2 outputs z k .
We prove the following theorem in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. Let s (resp., n) be the statistical (resp., computational) security parameter. If the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in (G, g, q) , h is a one-way function, and the circuit is garbled using an adaptively secure garbling scheme, then for all polynomial values of t, the protocol described above securely computes f [t] in the presence of a malicious adversary with error at most 2 −s + µ(n) for some negligible function µ(·). case, the trusted party sends f i ( x , y ) to the honest party (recall that i denotes the index of the honest party). In the latter case, the trusted party sends the special symbol ⊥ to the honest party.
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Outputs: The corrupted party outputs nothing, and A outputs an arbitrary function of its view to Z . The honest party outputs whatever it was sent by the trusted party to Z . In the end, Z outputs a bit. We let Ideal f,A,Z(z) (1 n ) denote the output of Z .
Execution in the real model. In the real model, we have parties P 1 and P 2 who execute a two-party protocol Π f . The protocol Π f has a parameter t initialized by Z, which specifies the number of times f is evaluated in parallel. P 1 and P 2 obtain their inputs x and y, respectively, from Z, and obtain their outputs z 1 and z 2 , respectively, by executing Π f using their respective inputs. The honest party sends its output to Z and the adversary sends an arbitrary function of its view to Z . Throughout the protocol execution, A obtains the inputs of the corrupted party and sends all messages on its behalf, whereas the honest party follows the instructions of Π f . In the end, Z outputs a bit. We let Real Π f ,A,Z(z) (1 n ) denote the output of Z .
Security as emulation of an ideal execution in the real model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated as follows:
Definition 1. Protocol Π f is said to securely compute f (t) if for every ppt adversary A in the real model, there exists a ppt adversary SS in the ideal model such that for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time environment Z that specifies the number of executions as t, it holds that
Remarks. The definition above is somewhat similar to security definitions in the Universal Composability (UC) framework [Can01] in the way we define security as the success probability of an environment Z that attempts to distinguish between the ideal world and the real world. In spite of this we stress that our definition is not as strong as the UC definition, as the latter allows Z to interact arbitrarily with A during the protocol execution. On the other hand, our security definition is somewhat closer to the security definition for parallel composition of protocols [Can00] .
A.2 Definition of Security for Sequential Executions
Execution in the ideal model. In the ideal model, we have parties P 1 and P 2 , and an adversary A who can corrupt one of the two parties. Let P j for j ∈ {1, 2} denote the corrupted party and P i for i = {1, 2}\{j} denote the honest party. An ideal execution for the computation of the function f multiple times sequentially proceeds as follows.
Auxiliary Input: P 1 and P 2 hold 1 n , where n is the security parameter, and Z holds auxiliary input z. In addition, Z provides P 1 and P 2 a parameter t which denotes the number of times f is executed.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ t:
Inputs: P 1 and P 2 obtain inputs x k ∈ {0, 1} and y k ∈ {0, 1} , respectively, from Z .
Send inputs to TP: The honest party sends its input to the trusted party, TP. The corrupted party, P j , may send any value of its choice. Denote the pair of inputs sent to the trusted party by (x k , y k ).
TP sends outputs to A: If x k (resp., y k ) is not a valid -bit input, TP sets x k (resp., y k ) to some default value. TP sends f j (x k , y k ) to A.
TP sends outputs to honest party: The adversary chooses whether to continue or abort; this is formalized by having A send either a continue or abort message to TP. In the former case, the trusted party sends f i (x k , y k ) to the honest party. In the latter case, the trusted party sends the special symbol ⊥ to the honest party.
Outputs:
The corrupted party outputs nothing, and A outputs an arbitrary function of its view to Z . The honest party outputs whatever it was sent by the trusted party to Z . If the honest party receives ⊥ as output from the trusted party in iteration k, then it aborts the rest of the protocol.
At the end of t iterations, Z outputs a bit. We let Ideal f,A,Z(z) (1 n ) denote the output of Z .
Execution in the real model. In the real model, we have parties P 1 and P 2 who execute a two-party protocol Π f . The protocol Π f has a parameter t initialized by Z, which specifies the number of times f is evaluated. Protocol Π f is stateful across its execution spanning t stages.
In each stage, P 1 and P 2 obtain their inputs x k respectively y k from Z, and obtain their outputs z 1 k respectively z 2 k by executing Π f using their respective inputs. At the end of each stage, the honest party sends its output to Z and the adversary sends an arbitrary function of its view to Z . Throughout the protocol execution, A obtains the inputs of the corrupted party and sends all messages on its behalf, whereas the honest party follows the instructions of Π f . At the end of t stages of Π f , Z outputs a bit. We let Real Π f ,A,Z(z) (1 n ) denote the output of Z.
Security as emulation of an ideal execution in the real model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated as follows.
Definition 2. Protocol Π f is said to securely compute f [t] if for every ppt adversary A in the real model, there exists a ppt adversary SS in the ideal model such that for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time environment Z that specifies the number of executions as t, it holds that
Remarks. As in the parallel executions case, this definition differs from the definitions in the Universal Composability (UC) framework [Can01] , since in our setting we restrict Z to interact with A only between stages of the protocol Π f , but never within a stage.
B Proof in the Parallel Execution Setting
Theorem. Let s (resp., n) be the statistical (resp., computational) security parameter. If the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in (G, g, q) , h is a one-way function, and the underlying circuit garbling procedure is secure [LP07] , then for all t = poly(n), the protocol described in Section 2 securely computes f (t) in the presence of a malicious adversary with error at most 2 −s + µ(n) for some negligible function µ(·).
Proof. We prove security in a hybrid model where a trusted third party computes the batch singlechoice multi-stage cut-and-choose oblivious transfer functionality in Step 2, the zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge functionality in Step 9. We split the analysis into two cases depending on whether P 1 or P 2 is corrupted.
P 1 is corrupted. The intuition is that P 1 can cheat only if it can construct incorrect circuits. To do this, P 1 needs to construct a small enough number of incorrect circuits such that it will not get caught in the first cut-and-choose stage; however, it need also construct a large enough number such that one of the buckets contains all incorrect circuits. This is due to the fact that P 2 aborts if it finds an invalid check circuit, and learns P 1 's input (and thus the correct output) if a given bucket contains at least one correctly constructed circuit. This implies that the number of corrupt circuits m constructed by a malicious P 1 must be such that ρ/2 ≤ m ≤ ρt/2. We stress that m is fixed once P 1 sends the circuits in Step 3; that is, P 1 cannot further "corrupt" circuits after this step. Now observe that the probability with which m bad circuits escape detection in the first stage cut-and-choose is ρt−m ρt/2 / ρt ρt/2 . Conditioned on this event happening, the probability that a particular bucket contains all bad circuits is m ρ/2 / ρt/2 ρ/2 . Applying the union bound, we conclude that the probability that P 1 succeeds in cheating is bounded by
Since it is given that the maximum value of this expression is less than 2 −s for parameter ρ chosen in the protocol, we have that the probability of cheating is at most 2 −s . We now proceed to the formal proof. Let A be an adversary controlling P 1 with input x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ). Since P 1 receives no output, we need only show that the difference in probability that P 2 aborts in the real world versus the ideal world in negligible. We construct a simulator S with access to a trusted party computing f (t) as follows:
1. S acts as an honest P 2 would for the entire protocol execution, using input y = (0 , . . . , 0 ) throughout.
For each k ∈ [t]
, let x k = σ k,1 , . . . , σ k, be P 1 's witness to the zero-knowledge proof-ofknowledge in Step 9. S extracts these values through the ideal functionality interface.
3. If would P 2 abort at any point in the protocol, then S sends ⊥ to the ideal functionality computing f (t) . Otherwise, it sends x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) and receives back z = f (t) (x, y).
We now claim that the distributions from A interacting with P 2 in the real world versus A interacting with S in the ideal world are indistinguishable. To do so, we construct a set of hybrids, starting from the real execution and ending at the ideal execution, and show that each hybrid is indistinguishable from its neighbors. Here, we provide a sketch of these hybrids. The first hybrid is simply the real world execution of the protocol. The next hybrid is equivalent, except that we extract P 1 's input x = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) from the zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge ideal functionality in Step 9. Instead of outputting P 2 's output from the execution of the protocol, we instead pass x to the trusted third party, and output f (t) (x , y).
These two hybrids differ if the output of P 2 differs from the output computed by the trusted third party. This happens if one of the evaluation buckets contains all maliciously constructed circuits. As was shown above, this happens with probability < 2 −s , and thus we conclude that these hybrids are indistinguishable.
The next hybrid is the same as the prior one, except that P 2 uses input y = (0 , . . . , 0 ) throughout. Noting that P 2 only uses y as input to the F mcot functionality in Step 2, we conclude that the two hybrids are perfectly indistinguishable.
As this last hybrid is the same as the simulator S given above, we conclude that the protocol is secure. P 2 is corrupted. The intuition for security in the case that P 2 is corrupt is standard [LP11, Lin13] , and thus we jump right to the proof.
Let A be an adversary controlling P 2 with input y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ). We assume the existence of a simulator S which constructs garbled circuits with fixed outputs which are indistinguishable from correctly garbled circuits. Such a simulator is known to exist [LP09, LP07] . Also, we use the simulator from [LP11] , which we denote as S .
We construct a simulator S with access to a trusted party computing f (t) as follows:
1. S extracts P 2 's input y and sets J, J 1 , . . . , J t from the call to F mcot .
2. S sends y to the trusted party, receiving back z = (z 1 , . . . , z t ) = f (t) (x, y).
3. For every j ∈ J, S constructs a valid garbled circuit. For every k ∈ [t] and for every j ∈ J k , S uses S to construct a garbled circuit that outputs the fixed string z k irrespective of the input.
4. S uses S to simulate the 2PC protocol in Step 7.
5. Otherwise, S runs the protocol as an honest P 1 would.
6. Upon protocol termination, Soutputs whatever A outputs and halts.
We now claim that the distributions from A interacting with P 2 in the real world versus A interacting with S in the ideal world are indistinguishable. To do so, we again construct a set of hybrids, starting from the real world and ending at the ideal world, and show that each hybrid is indistinguishable from its neighbors. Here, we provide a sketch of these hybrids. The first hybrid is simply the real world execution of the protocol. The following hybrid is equivalent, except as follows. We extract A's input y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ) and the sets J 1 , . . . , J t from the call to F mcot in Step 2. Let z = (z 1 , . . . , z t ) = f (t) (x, y ) be the output of the trusted third party. Let J = [ρt] \ ∪ k J k . For j ∈ J, we construct correctly garbled circuits, and for j ∈ J k for all k, we use S to construct a circuit which always outputs z k .
We claim that these two hybrids are indistinguishable. Note that A can distinguish if either he can open one of the simulated garbled circuits, or he can evaluate a simulated garbled circuit in bucket k on something other than y k . The only way for one of the above situations to occur is if A can guess input keys for garbled circuits in Step 4. Clearly, this happens with negligible probability.
The following hybrid is the same as the above hybrid, except we replace the real 2PC execution in Step 7 with a simulated execution using S . Due to the security of S (as was shown in [LP11]), we conclude that these two hybrids are indistinguishable.
Finally, the last hybrid is the same as the above one, except that we use x = (0 , . . . , 0 ) as P 1 's input throughout. Note that this affects Step 5, where A receives P 1 's inputs g a x k,i i ·r j ; however, by the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, A cannot extract a x k,i i from this expression, and thus cannot deduce that P 1 's input is x as defined above. Thus, the two hybrids are indistinguishable.
As this last hybrid is the same the simulator S given above, we conclude that the protocol is secure.
C Proof in the Sequential Execution Setting
Theorem. Let s (resp., n) be the statistical (resp., computational) security parameter. If the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in (G, g, q) , h is a one-way function, and the circuit is garbled using an adaptively secure garbling scheme, then for all polynomial values of t, the protocol described in Section 3 securely computes f [t] in the presence of a malicious adversary with error at most 2 −s + µ(n) for some negligible function µ(·).
Proof. The proof is similar to the parallel case. The two major changes are the use of the XOR-tree to avoid the selective failure attack (in place of cut-and-choose oblivious transfer), and the use of adaptively secure garbling. P 1 is corrupted. The intuition here is the same as for the parallel execution setting, and thus we jump straight to the simulator. Let A be an adversary controlling P 1 . We construct a simulator S with access to a trusted party computing f as follows:
1. S acts exactly as an honest P 2 would for the entire off-line phase of the protocol.
2. Likewise, S acts exactly as an honest P 2 would for each of the t executions of the on-line phase, using y = 0 as its input for each iteration, except as follows:
S extracts P 1 's input x k from the zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge in Step 7 of the on-line phase, and sends it to the trusted third party, receiving back the output z k . If an honest P 2 would abort at any step in the protocol, S sends ⊥ to the trusted third party; otherwise, S sends x and receives f (x, y) in return. Now, as was shown in [Lin13] and in Appendix B, the probability that the output in the ideal and real world are identical across all t executions is exactly one minus the probability that a given bucket contains all maliciously constructed circuits. As was shown in Appendix B, this probability is < 2 −s . P 2 is corrupted. Let A be an adversary controlling P 2 . Again, the intuition here is similar to the parallel execution setting. However, we cannot use the standard simulator for garbled circuits anymore, as we need adaptively secure garbled circuits. Instead, we make use of an adaptively secure garbling simulator [BHR12] . In particular, we need to use a simulator for the all2 definition of security, which provides fine-grained adaptive security in terms of privacy, obliviousness, and authenticity. Bellare, Hoang, and Rogaway [BHR12] show the existence of such a simulator, which we denote by S = (S 1 , S 2 ), in the Random Oracle Model. This simulator has two "stages": S 1 constructs a simulated garbled circuit, and S 2 , given input y, constructs simulated input keys for input y. We also utilize the simulator for [LP11] , which we denote by S . We construct a simulator S with access to a trusted party computing f as follows:
1. S the acts exactly as an honest P 1 would for the entire off-line phase of the protocol, except for the following:
Prior to Step 1, S chooses a random string r of size ρt such that half of the bits in r are set to one. Then, for each i ∈ [ρt], if r i = 1 then S constructs a correctly garbled circuit; if r 1 = 0 then S uses S 1 to construct a simulated adaptively-secure garbled circuit. In
Step 1(c), for those circuits with r i = 1, S uses the inputs keys generated by S 1 , otherwise S constructs the input keys as specified in the protocol. In Step 3, S sets the secure coin-tossing protocol to output r.
2. In the on-line phase, S acts as follows:
S uses x = 0 as its input for each iteration. In Step 3, S receives P 2 's input y k from the OT functionality. It then runs S 2 on y k , receiving back encoded values (D 0 i,k , D 1 i,k ), and sends D y k,i i,k to P 2 through the OT functionality interface. In Step 6, S uses S to simulate the execution of circuit C . Otherwise, S runs exactly as an honest P 1 would.
We now claim that the distributions from A interacting with P 2 in the real world versus A interacting with S in the ideal world are indistinguishable by Z . The argument is nearly equivalent to that shown in the parallel execution case, and is thus omitted.
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